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ABSTRACT
For a comparatively small and geographically peripheral nation, New Zealand enjoyed a moment of psepho-
logical prominence some 20 years ago when it abandoned its long-used single member plurality (SMP) vot-
ing system for a new mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral process. This national decision to swap
the blunt simplicity of single party majority government in favor of the vagaries of proportional representa-
tion and coalition rule was particularly notable in light of New Zealand’s status as a long-established, com-
paratively peaceful democracy that still adheres staunchly to a traditional Westminster form of government.
The various reasons for taking this fundamental step, as well as the process used to do so, have been well
picked over, and I do not propose adding substantially to the already existing literature on the subject. Rather,
I take up the story since New Zealand’s ‘‘big bang’’ move to MMP and outline a number of electoral law
developments (and, just as importantly, refusals to change) that have taken place in that time. It is thus some-
thing of an updating of New Zealand’s experience with electoral law reform over the last two decades, paying
particular attention to the process that has been used to effect that reform.
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For a comparatively small and geographi-cally peripheral nation, New Zealand enjoyed
a moment of psephological prominence some 20
years ago when it abandoned its long-used single
member plurality (SMP) voting system for a new
mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral pro-
cess. This national decision to swap the blunt sim-
plicity of single party majority government in favor
of the vagaries of proportional representation and co-
alition rule was particularly notable in light of New
Zealand’s status as a long-established, comparatively
peaceful democracy that still adheres staunchly to a
traditional Westminster form of government.1 The
various reasons for taking this fundamental step, as
well as the process used to do so, have been well
picked over, and I do not propose adding substan-
tially to the already existing literature on the subject.
Rather, I take up the story since New Zealand’s ‘‘big
bang’’ move to MMP to outline a number of electoral
law developments (and, just as importantly, refusals
to change) that have taken place in that time.
More fundamentally, this article considers the
range of different ways in which decisions about
New Zealand’s electoral laws are made. This
‘‘how change occurs’’ question is important because
of the central role that voting plays in the country’s
overall constitutional arrangements. New Zealand
retains a now-unique commitment to a strong
Diceyan concept of parliamentary sovereignty.2
That is to say, enactments of the New Zealand
Andrew Geddis is a professor, Faculty of Law, at the University
of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand.
1See generally Andrew Geddis, Parliamentary Government in
New Zealand: Lines of Continuity and Moments of Change,
14 Int’l J. Const. L. 99 (2016).
2
Mark Tushnet, Advanced Introduction to Compara-
tive Constitutional Law 41 (2014) (describing New Zea-
land as ‘‘the only [constitutional] system that remains
committed in theory to parliamentary sovereignty’’).
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Parliament remain the nation’s highest form of law,
and no individual or other institution (including the
nation’s courts) may invalidate or refuse to apply
such legislation. Consequently, not only does Parlia-
ment retain the last word on all matters of law (in-
cluding electoral law), but also the process of
voting for elected representatives provides the fun-
damental legitimacy of lawmaking and governing
power. Therefore, while the perceived fairness of
the electoral process is important in all democratic
societies, it particularly matters in New Zealand
as no written constitutional framework constrains
the actions of representatives once elected. This
fact means that if the basic soundness of the elec-
toral process (and the laws that govern this) is
regarded with public suspicion, then the justifica-
tory basis for the country’s entire constitutional
arrangements is threatened. This fact then has im-
portant normative ramifications for how electoral
law change should take place in the New Zealand
context.
The first and most fundamental method of decid-
ing electoral law matters in New Zealand is through
direct involvement by the country’s voters in choos-
ing amongst a range of possible electoral systems
available for use in their country. The first part of
this article briefly recaps New Zealand’s adoption
of MMP by means of referendum vote, before
recounting the electorate’s revisiting of that deci-
sion in 2011. Following a majority decision to retain
MMP, the country’s Electoral Commission was
tasked with formulating recommendations for re-
forming the voting system. The second part exam-
ines these recommendations and their fate once
passed over to elected members of Parliament
(MPs), noting the regrettable partisan consider-
ations that led to their swift dismissal. The third
part moves to discuss three other electoral law de-
velopments ushered through Parliament that have
been marked by differing levels of partisan political
disagreement: a ban on sentenced prisoners voting;
changes to the regulation of electoral financing; and
the merger of the country’s electoral agencies. The
fourth part outlines why the nation’s judiciary has
not participated directly in these developments, at
least until very recently. It then notes the High
Court’s decision to formally declare a ban on pris-
oner voting to be inconsistent with the legislatively
guaranteed right to vote and explains how this judi-
cial move fits with how electoral law reform in New
Zealand generally is carried out.
MMP’S POPULAR ADOPTION
(AND RETENTION) IN NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand’s decision to change electoral sys-
tems in 1992–93 has been analyzed in depth else-
where.3 To summarize and simplify, New
Zealand’s longstanding use of SMP voting in parlia-
mentary elections combined with strong forms of
inter-party discipline to create an effective two-
party duopoly competing to win governmental
power. Furthermore, New Zealand’s Westminster-
style constitution, unicameral legislature, and lack
of any written constitution meant that whichever
party captured government office faced very few
checks on its lawmaking and administrative powers.
A period of extensive economic and social reforms
carried out between 1984–92 then convinced a wide
section of the public that these existing political pro-
cesses failed to give voters adequate control over ei-
ther Parliament or government:
The impetus for electoral reform in the 1990s
reflected a profound sense of voter disillusion-
ment with the radical policies of successive .
governments. . Rather than curbing the pow-
ers of the big two parties by way of constitu-
tional reform, with a written constitution and
upper house as potential options, MMP pro-
vided the less radical alternative of a multi-
party legislature and executive.4
Pressed by this public disenchantment with the perfor-
mance of their elected representatives and caught by
an earlier election promise to hold a referendum on
electoral reform, the government reluctantly asked
the voters directly which voting system they would
prefer to use. Swayed by an earlier report from a
Royal Commission on the Electoral System, which
unexpectedly had recommended replacing the exist-
ing electoral system with the MMP model used in
3The most complete account of both the factors causing and the
process leading to the introduction of the mixed-member propor-
tional (MMP) electoral process into New Zealand remains Keith
Jackson and Allan McRobie, New Zealand Adopts Pro-
portional Representation: Accident? Design? Evolu-
tion? (1998). My own discussion of the change can be found
at Andrew Geddis, Electoral Law in New Zealand:
Practice and Policy 20–25 (2nd ed. 2014).
4Raymond Miller and Pierce Lane, Future of the MMP Elec-
toral System, in New Zealand Government and Politics
181 (5th ed., Raymond Miller ed., 2010).

















































(as it was then) West Germany,5 in 1993 the electorate
ultimately endorsed this new proportional representa-
tion voting system by a 53.9% to 46.1% majority.
MMP has since been used in seven parliamentary
elections. While many politicians6 and academics7
view the change as positive for New Zealand’s polit-
ical processes due to its more proportional out-
comes, greater representativeness, and ending of
all-powerful single-party majority government, a
significant proportion of the population remained
unconvinced of its virtues. Common criticisms are
that the system gives smaller parties ‘‘too much’’
power and hampers the effectiveness of government,
while coalition building leads to undemocratic post-
election deals being struck between parties. Further-
more, there was a widely held (albeit incorrect) belief
that when MMP first was adopted voters were explic-
itly promised a future opportunity to review its per-
formance. Seeking to capitalize on this mood, the
major opposition party promised to hold another ref-
erendum on the electoral system. It felt bound by that
commitment upon winning office in 2008, so voters
were once again asked at the 2011 general election
whether they wished to change their voting system.
This time change was rejected, with an increased ma-
jority of 58% favoring the existing MMP system and
42% rejecting it.8 That outcome was entirely predict-
able as there was nothing like the general public dis-
satisfaction with the performance of political actors
that had spurred the earlier decision to alter voting
systems.9 The real question thus was not whether
MMP should still be used for New Zealand’s elec-
tions but rather what precise rules ought to apply to
that voting system.
THE STILLBORN REFORMS TO MMP
When the voters’ 2011 verdict cemented MMP’s
future, the Electoral Commission was statutorily re-
quired to review certain of its aspects and advise on
any reforms.10 It commenced a process of public en-
gagement that produced first an issues paper with
proposed changes and then, following further public
engagement, a final report to the government.11
Although non-binding, this report contained recom-
mendations that reflected the general views of the
numerous individuals and groups who had partici-
pated in the review process. In particular, the Com-
mission proposed two reforms to the existing MMP
system to counter specific public concerns.
First, the Commission recommended removing
the so-called ‘‘electorate lifeboat’’ rule whereby par-
ties that win an individual electorate seat are exemp-
ted from the primary threshold requirement of
winning five percent of the party vote before receiv-
ing party list seats in Parliament.12 The Commis-
sion’s view was that this rule served no useful
purpose and only incentivized gaming behavior,
with parties making accommodations in individual
electorates to help potential coalition partners ob-
tain parliamentary representation. This behavior
then was a primary source of reported dissatisfac-
tion with MMP’s operation, with public opinion
strongly favoring its abolition.13 However, the Com-
mission also recognized that removing the elector-
ate lifeboat rule would make it harder for smaller
parties to gain parliamentary representation and
thus could lead to a less representative institution.
To counteract this risk, the Commission recommen-
ded reducing the remaining representation threshold
from five to four percent of the party vote.14 While
this still represents a significant hurdle for new po-
litical parties in particular to surmount, the Com-
mission believed that any lower threshold risked
the fragmentation of parliamentary representation
in ways that the public disapproved of.15
Overall, the Commission’s review was markedly
conservative. The bulk of its final report favored
either retaining the status quo or making only
5
Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Report of
the Royal Commission on the Electoral System:
Towards a Better Democracy 63–64 (1986).
6See, e.g., Charles Chauvel, A Better Democracy, Thanks to
MMP, in Reconstituting the Constitution 199 (Caroline
Morris, Jonathan Boston, and Petra Butler eds., 2011).
7See, e.g., Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer,
Bridled Power: New Zealand’s Constitution and Gov-
ernment 376–378 (4th ed. 2004); Jack Nagel, Evaluating
Democracy in New Zealand Under MMP, 8 Pol’y Q. 3 (2012).
8Andrew Geddis, New Zealand Votes to Keep Proportional
Representation, 23 Pub. L. Rev. 3, 4–6 (2012).
9Miller and Lane, supra note 4, at 181–182.
10Electoral Referendum Act, 2010, No. 139, x 78. For a discus-
sion of the Electoral Commission and its role see infra, notes
32–36 and accompanying text.
11N.Z. Electoral Commission, Report of the Electoral Commis-

























































minor adjustments to the existing rules. However,
its recommendations to change the dual representa-
tion thresholds proved overly challenging for the
political parties whose MPs were required to enact
them into law. In particular, parties in the governing
coalition rejected the Commission’s recommenda-
tions in their entirety, while opposition parties sup-
ported those aspects of reform that they thought
most advantageous to their interests. Claiming this
disagreement demonstrated there was ‘‘no consen-
sus for any change’’ amongst political actors, the
minister of justice quickly announced that no fur-
ther action would be taken on the matter; while
the prime minister stated that as far as the govern-
ment was concerned, the review process it itself
had initiated was at an end. The fate of the Commis-
sion’s report thus illustrates the underlying danger
of leaving the final decision on electoral law to
those elected representatives. The outcome all-too-
often will be what those representatives see as
being in their best interests, rather than what the vot-
ing public believe their electoral process ought to
look like.
CHANGES TO PRISONER VOTING,
POLITICAL FINANCING,
AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION
The failure to implement any of the Commis-
sion’s recommended changes to MMP was driven
by nakedly partisan considerations. The governing
party quite openly stated that it opposed the re-
forms precisely because it believed these would
complicate its winning office again in the future.16
Its support partners in government, whose parlia-
mentary existence depended on the electorate life-
boat rule the Electoral Commission recommended
scrapping, unsurprisingly agreed that no changes
should be made. And while the voting public
largely favored the proposals, this was a soft sup-
port that did not generate the necessary political
pressure to overcome the incumbent self-interest
involved. This sort of partisan calculation on the
part of elected MPs also has featured to varying
degrees in respect of three other recent changes
to New Zealand’s electoral laws: the imposition
of a voting ban on sentenced prisoners; new restric-
tions on political financing; and the merger of the
country’s electoral administration agencies into
one organization.
Banning prisoners from voting
Prisoners’ voting rights have varied markedly over
the 160 years New Zealand has held elections.17 How-
ever, in 1993, general agreement appeared to have
been reached on the issue when Parliament unani-
mously agreed that prisoners serving sentences of
three or more years (the equivalent of the length of
the parliamentary term) could not register to vote,
but prisoners serving lesser sentences could. That
compromise position remained in place largely unre-
marked until 2010, when a governing party MP pro-
posed that voting rights be once again removed
from all serving prisoners. The rationale for doing
so was unclear, with the MP responsible merely stat-
ing that prisoners had ‘‘committed crimes against the
community sufficient to forfeit their right to have a
say in its governance.’’18
While this proposal did not represent official
government policy, the governing party nevertheless
chose to bloc vote in support of its MP’s proposal. It
was joined by one of its support partners in govern-
ment, providing a 63–58 majority in New Zealand’s
single-chamber Parliament. On this party-line basis
the measure passed through the various stages of
parliamentary debate and voting, before finally
being enacted into law in late 2010.19 I have
strongly criticized the procedure used to make this
law change elsewhere.20 To summarize, MPs were
formally notified when the bill first was introduced
that stopping all prisoners from voting unjustifiably
limited the legislatively guaranteed right to vote
contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990 (NZBORA).21 While this fact could not in
16New Zealand National Party, Submission on the MMP Pro-




17See Greg Robins, The Rights of Prisoners to Vote: A Review
of Prisoner Disenfranchisement in New Zealand, 4 N.Z. J.
Pub. and Int’l L. 165, 166–171 (2006).
18Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amend-
ment Bill, No. 117-1.
19Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amend-
ment Act, 2010, No. 128.
20Andrew Geddis, Prisoner Voting and Rights Deliberation:
How New Zealand’s Parliament Failed, [2011] N.Z. L. Rev.
443.
21Christopher Finlayson, Report of the Attorney-General under
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Electoral (Dis-
qualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill, J4
(2010).

















































itself prevent Parliament from enacting the measure,
nor (as will be seen below) does any such unjusti-
fied limitation render the law invalid,22 it ought to
have given pause to those MPs minded to support
it. However, far from prompting careful deliberation
on the rights and wrongs of taking the proposed
step, the warning was completely ignored. Instead,
when supporters of change even bothered justifying
their vote during the parliamentary debates, they did
so on the simple basis that prisoners are bad people
who have done bad things and so should not be
allowed to vote.23
This rather perfunctory legislative process sug-
gests that the law change was motivated less by con-
sidered reflection of the proposal’s intrinsic merits
and more by the opportunity to send a policy mes-
sage to the electorate generally. Removing the vot-
ing rights of prisoners permitted the government
to burnish its ‘‘tough on criminals’’ image while
at the same time painting those opposing the change
as ‘‘soft on crime.’’24 In this sense, the voting rights
of some 3,000 New Zealanders were used purely as
an instrumental weapon in the partisan battle for po-
litical power. That was and is quite deplorable. As is
discussed below, the New Zealand courts take a
similar view of the matter.25
Restrictions on political financing
A rather patchy set of rules governed the financ-
ing of individual candidates and political parties up
until New Zealand’s 2005 general election.26 Candi-
dates and parties faced overall spending caps on ad-
vertising in the three months prior to an election, but
there was no limit on donations to such actors.
Requirements to publicly disclose donor identity
could be lawfully evaded and so were effectively
voluntary in nature. Third-party groups or individu-
als faced no restrictions on conducting parallel ad-
vertising campaigns, nor did they have to publicly
disclose who funded such messages. At the 2005
election, however, an unprecedented amount of
third-party spending took place on advertising in
opposition to the governing parties. Furthermore, al-
legations were levelled that the main opposition
party had received undisclosed campaign funding
from overseas sources.27 These events prompted
the narrowly reelected governing coalition to pro-
pose a set of new restrictions on political financing,
purportedly to prevent the electoral system being cor-
rupted by ‘‘big money.’’ Third-party spending on
electoral advertising would be radically restricted
for the entirety of an election year and such partici-
pants would be required to disclose the identity of
their donors. Political parties also would face tougher
donation disclosure requirements, along with a ban
on receiving anonymous or foreign donations above
a small amount. Such changes, the government
claimed, were necessary to ensure the overall integ-
rity of New Zealand’s electoral processes.
As with the prisoner voting example discussed
above, the reform legislation can be criticized on
both substantive and procedural grounds.28 In par-
ticular, the bill’s original proposed restrictions on
third-party electoral participation were excessively
draconian. Third parties would be required to regis-
ter with the Electoral Commission and thereafter
were to be restricted to spending no more than
NZ$60,000 (US$41,000) on ‘‘electoral advertise-
ments’’ for the entire election year. Furthermore,
the proposed definition of electoral advertisements
was very wide, capturing any message that advo-
cated a policy position with which a political
party or candidate was associated. In terms of the
process used, the draft legislation had no input
from opposition political parties or wider civil soci-
ety. Consequently, it was no surprise that opposition
parties decried the measures as an attempt to muzzle
criticism in order to help the incumbent regime re-
tain office. Public opposition to the legislation
also was widespread and vocal. Although this criti-
cism of the original proposal’s severity resulted in
some softening amendments, the Electoral Financ-
ing Act 2007 (EFA) still was enacted on a straight
party-line parliamentary vote. The leader of the
main opposition party—which not only was ideo-
logically opposed to government regulation but tra-
ditionally had enjoyed an advantage in electoral
22See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
23See, e.g., Simon Bridges, N.Z.P.D., Vol. 668, p. 15184 (Nov.
10, 2010) (‘‘There is no reason why serving prisoners should
have the right to vote. Those people have landed in the clink be-
cause they have done something serious.’’).
24See, e.g., id. (‘‘[Opposition] members are soft on crime. They
want criminals to vote.’’).
25See infra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
26For a history of political finance regulation in New Zealand
see Geddis, supra note 3, at 136–140.
27Id. at 138–139.
28See Andrew Geddis, New Zealand’s Electoral Finance Act



















































spending—then promised that if elected, ‘‘the first
thing [we] will do is repeal this legislation.’’29
This promise duly was delivered upon when,
despite the new political financing law’s alleged
incumbent-protecting purpose, the 2008 election
produced a change in government. However, the
election of a new administration also resulted in a
different approach to the issue. First, the new gov-
ernment did not repeal the EFA in its entirety, in-
stead preserving the new rules requiring greater
public disclosure of donors to parties and candidates
(but not third-party organizations). Second, all but
one of the parliamentary parties supported repealing
the legislative restrictions on third-party participa-
tion. This virtually unanimous recognition that the
controls imposed on third parties had been overly
zealous carried over to the creation of an all-party
parliamentary Electoral Legislation Committee,
which sought public submissions on what replace-
ment political financing rules ought to be adopted.
When public opinion and the now opposition parties
argued in favor of retaining some controls on third-
party election spending, the government agreed to a
compromise set of rules.30 Under these rules, third
parties are still required to register with the Elec-
toral Commission before engaging in substantial ad-
vertising campaigns and face overall constraints on
their electoral advertising spends, but that cap was
lifted significantly, and no requirement to disclose
donors was included.31 Furthermore, these regula-
tions only apply to (in effect) a three-month window
prior to a general election. This replacement legisla-
tion was then enacted on a parliamentary vote of
112–9.
This turn away from partisan contestation toward
cross-party compromise may be explained by a
number of factors. There was little perceived polit-
ical advantage in the nation’s various political par-
ties and their MPs continuing to battle over the
issue of political financing. The newly elected gov-
ernment, having strongly criticized its predecessor
for acting in a unilateral manner when setting polit-
ical financing rules, faced potential charges of hy-
pocrisy should it do likewise. The now opposition
parties recognized the EFA had been unpopular
with the public and so wished to move on from
the issue quickly and quietly. Finally, the new min-
ister of justice genuinely was committed to trying to
reach as consensual an outcome as possible on this
issue because of the threat posed to overall public
trust in the electoral process by MPs’ partisan bick-
ering. In so doing he accepted that the governing
party had to compromise on its ideological opposi-
tion to limits on electoral speech and recognize that,
within New Zealand’s political culture, these were
widely considered desirable. As such, the final out-
come reflected a general political compromise, and
the new law’s governing principle was ‘‘what sort of
electoral rules do the New Zealand voters think best
in their democracy?’’
Reorganization of electoral agencies
Up until 2010, three different agencies managed
various aspects of New Zealand’s electoral process-
es.32 Although the division of labor between these
entities was reasonably clear, their relationship
was confusing for electoral participants and the gen-
eral public. In addition, their interaction heavily
relied on goodwill and informal understandings
rather than formal lines of communication. Differ-
ent agencies also took different approaches to
their roles, while the potential for government inter-
ference (even if never actualized) in the work of
each differed. Consequently, there were numerous
calls over many years to simplify the administrative
structure through amalgamation.
The Electoral (Administration) Amendment Act
2010 did just that. By way of a two-stage process,
the chief electoral officer and the Electoral Com-
mission were merged into a new Electoral Commis-
sion for the 2011 election, with the Electoral
Enrolment Centre’s responsibilities then incorpo-
rated before the 2014 election.33 This timetable
was adopted to minimize disruption to the adminis-
trative agencies’ operations, especially with respect
to the nation’s electoral rolls. Two points about this
reform process are notable. First, it was entirely free
of the sort of partisan wrangling that marked the is-
sues of MMP reform, prisoner voting, or political fi-
nancing, with the legislation unanimously supported
in Parliament. Second, there was no disagreement
29Audrey Young, Key: This Will Be the First Thing to Go, N.Z.
Herald (Dec. 5, 2007), available at <http://www.nzherald
.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10480387>.
30See generally Geddis, supra note 3, at 140–155.
31Third parties (or ‘‘promoters’’) may spend up to NZ$315,000
on ‘‘electoral advertisements.’’
32Additionally, a separate Representation Commission is con-
stituted following the national census every five years to redraw
the boundaries between constituencies.
33The Electoral Commission’s current role is described in Geddis,
supra note 3, at ch. 13.

















































over the new Electoral Commission’s essential form
and function.34 MPs from all parties agreed that it
ought to consist of non-partisan members appointed
by Parliament (not the current government)35 and
operate under a statutory mandate of indepen-
dence.36 This consensus reflects an underlying be-
lief in New Zealand’s political culture about what
is desirable and practicable in electoral administra-
tion. Once embodied in law, the nation’s electoral
rules and processes ought to be applied in ways
that are not susceptible to partisan manipulation or
favoritism. And it is thought possible for an agency
to operate without being captured by the interests of
any political party or ideology. That is not to say
that politicians or their parties do not accuse elec-
toral administrators of making mistakes or acting
incorrectly.37 But it is notable that no recent elec-
toral contest has produced an allegation that an elec-
toral agency or individual polling place official has
acted in a biased or partial manner.
JUDICIAL (NON)INVOLVEMENT
IN ELECTORAL REFORM
The above account of recent electoral reforms
makes virtually no mention of New Zealand’s courts.
Under the nation’s unwritten constitution in which
Parliament retains complete legislative supremacy,
the judiciary has only a comparatively minor role
to play in this area. It is charged with interpreting
and applying electoral legislation where the meaning
of some provision is disputed in a particular factual
situation.38 Equally, it may review the actions of
the Electoral Commission to ensure that these com-
ply with the law (including judicially imposed stan-
dards of administrative propriety).39 However, the
courts have no constitutional power to invalidate
electoral legislation enacted by Parliament, nor
may they refuse to apply clearly worded legislative
provisions that are thought to improperly infringe
on electoral rights. So, for example, when opponents
of the EFA asked the courts to intervene in the pas-
sage of that legislation on the basis that the proposed
measures unjustifiably limited third-party free
speech rights, the courts refused to do so.40 The ulti-
mate desirability or appropriateness of any given
electoral rule has been, in the courts’ view, a matter
for Parliament to decide.
However, a recent court decision suggests a new
judical preparedness to take action in situations
where Parliament is judged to have failed in its law-
making role. The case involved a challenge brought
by a group of serving prisoners to the blanket ban on
prisoner voting.41 They claimed that the legislation
represented an unjustified limit on the right to vote
guaranteed under section 12(a) of the NZBORA.
Although the existence of such an unjustified limit
cannot invalidate the ban or otherwise permit pris-
oners to vote,42 the plaintiffs nevertheless asked
the High Court to formally declare its existence.
In response, the Crown positively admitted that
the ban represented an unjustified limit on the
right—the attorney general already had conveyed
this conclusion to Parliament43—but denied that
the Court could issue the sort of formal declaration
sought. Ultimately, the High Court sided with the
plaintiffs and issued a novel remedy of a formal
‘‘declaration of inconsistency’’ with the NZBORA.
The remedy’s express purpose is to send a message
to the New Zealand public regarding the nature of
the law,44 whereupon ‘‘[a]ny political consequences
of [the] decision can be debated in the court of pub-
lic opinion, or in Parliament.’’45 The assumption is
that this expression of judicial disapproval towards
the legislation’s fundamental nature will lead to a
parliamentary reassessment of its merits, prompted
if necessary by public concern.
34Justice and Electoral Committee, Report on the Electoral
(Administration) Amendment Bill 93-2 (Apr. 26, 2010).
35Electoral Act 1993, No. 87, x 4D(1).
36Id. x 7.
37See, e.g., Peters v. Electoral Commission, [2016] N.Z.H.C.
394.
38See, e.g., Payne v. New Zealand National Party, [2008]
N.Z.H.C. 608, [2008] 3 N.Z.L.R. 233; Electoral Commission
v Watson, [2016] N.Z.C.A. 512.
39See, e.g., Kirk v. Electoral Commission, [2008] N.Z.H.C. 862;
Peters, [2016] N.Z.H.C. 394.
40Boscawen v. Attorney-General, [2009] N.Z.C.A. 12, [2009]
2 N.Z.L.R. 229.
41Taylor v. Attorney General, [2015] N.Z.H.C. 1706.
42Although the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
(NZBORA) purports to ‘‘guarantee’’ the right to vote, x 4 of
the legislation prohibits a court from invalidating or refusing
to apply legislation it believes infringes on this right. In this
sense, Parliament retains final authority over what the rights
guarantee means in practice. See generally Stephen Gard-
baum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitution-
alism: Theory and Practice 129–156 (2013).
43See supra note 21. Because the Crown admitted the existence
of an unjustified rights limit, the Court did not need to consider
this substantive issue. Rather, argument centered on the Court’s
remedial powers.
44Taylor, [2015] N.Z.H.C. 1706, {{ 30, 77(d).


















































I have three brief concluding comments about this
development. First, the fact this particular case pro-
duced the first NZBORA declaration reflects both
the foundational importance that the right to vote
holds in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements
and a degree of judicial concern that MPs did not
fully appreciate that importance when legislating.
Second, and relatedly, declarations of inconsistency
are in keeping with New Zealand’s primarily political
approach to rights issues, including electoral rights.
Where the courts consider that those political pro-
cesses have failed, as is the case in relation to prisoner
voting, the response is to try and prompt elected rep-
resentatives to revisit the matter in a deliberative man-
ner rather than compel them to adopt some solution.
And finally, questions surround the remedy’s effec-
tiveness.46 It will only work if MPs take the declara-
tion seriously or if the New Zealand public demands
that they do so. Absent such a response, there is no
further means of judicial enforcement. Which means
that while the case represents a tentative step towards
a more judicial involvement in the process of electoral
reform in New Zealand, it does not displace the pri-
mary presumption that elected representatives (and
sometimes the electors themselves) ought to have
the last say in what happens—be that for good or ill.
CONCLUSION
New Zealand’s electoral law is not a static phenom-
enon. Since the introduction of MMP in 1993, there
have been major changes in who may vote, how cam-
paigns can be financed, and who oversees the election
process. In addition, the very use of the MMP voting
system has been subject to popular review by way of a
referendum. Not only do the substantive decisions in
each of these areas matter, but the way in which they
are made also is important. For given the role that
elections play as the key—perhaps even the only—
legitimating feature in New Zealand’s constitutional
arrangements, how changes to its election laws
occur matters a great deal. This article has sought
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